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The	structure	of	episodic	memory:	Ganeri’s	“Mental	Time	Travel	and	
attention”*	
Susanna	Siegel,	Harvard	University	
Nico	Silins,	Cornell	University	
	Do	you	remember	reading	“Mental	Time	Travel	and	Attention”?		Where	were	you	when	you	were	taking	in	the	paper?	Or	if	you	have	ever	ridden	a	bicycle,	do	you	remember	when	you	first	rode	one?		Were	you	scared?		The	memories	such	questions	elicit,	at	least	when	they	are	based	on	a	putative	past	experience,	are	the	target	of	a	range	of	theories	in	Jonardon	Ganeri’s	“Mental	Time	Travel	and	Attention”.	Such	memories	are	examples	of	episodic	memories.				Episodic	memories	differ	from	some	memories	of	events	one	didn’t	live	through	(the	time	one’s	parents	met	each	other)	and	of	facts	that	aren’t	about	events	at	all	(sulfur	burns	yellow)	–	both	examples	of	‘semantic	memory’.1	Arguably,	you	can	even	semantically	remember	an	event	you	did	live	through,	as	when	you	might	remember	that	you	entered	Bulgaria	on	June	27th,	1964,	thanks	only	to	a	stamp	on	your	passport	(Vendler	1979).2		Episodic	memories	are	also	distinct	from	memories	encoded	in	skilled	action,	such	as	remembering	how	to	cook	rice	–	a	paradigm	of	‘procedural	memory’.3				To	get	a	more	vivid	feel	for	the	memories	Ganeri	has	in	mind,	consider	this	passage	he	cites	from	Buddhaghosa:	
	 “When	[entering]	purely	at	the	mind-door,	there	is	no	stimulating	of	a	sense	faculty’s	sensitivity.	Those	kinds	of	objects	normally	come	into	focus	as	seen,	as	heard,	as	smelt,	as	tasted,	or	as	touched.	How?	Here	someone	circumambulates	the	Great	Shrine	[in	Anurādhapura],	which	is	all	whitewashed,	painted	with	yellow	and	red	ochre,	etc.,	hung	with	many	kinds	of	flags	and	banners,	festooned	with	garlands	of	flowers….Then	after	he	has	seen	the	Shrine	…	at	another	time,	wherever	he	goes,	while	he	is	sitting	in	his	day	quarters	or	his	night	quarters,	as	soon	as	he	adverts	to	it,	it	is	as	if	the	Great	Shrine	decked	with	ornaments	came	into	focus	in	[lit.	came	to	the																																																									*	Many	thanks	to	Monima	Chadha,	Marvin	Chun,	Aaron	Glasser,	Parimal	Patil,	Antonia	Peacocke,	Cat	Prueitt,	Evan	Thompson,	and	Jonardon	Ganeri	for	comments	and	discussion,	and	to	Aaron	Glasser	for	research	assistance.	1	One	could	also	semantically	remember	falsehoods.			2	For	a	contrasting	attempt	to	assimilate	episodic	to	semantic	memory	see	Barclay	(1994).	3	Some	mental	phenomena	combine	procedural	and	semantic	memories,	such	as	when	one	recognizes	something	or	someone	one	has	seen	before.	If	you	know	what	avocados	look	like,	you	are	skilled	at	identifying	the	avocados	at	the	produce	stand,	but	you	presumably	also	know	some	facts	about	what	visible	features	avocados	have,	such	as	their	typical	shapes,	size,	and	texture.	For	discussion	of	this	phenomenon,	see	McGrath	(forthcoming).		
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avenue	of]	the	eye	door”	(quoted	by	Ganeri).		Here	is	how	Ganeri	interprets	the	main	passage	from	which	this	is	drawn.		 “Buddhaghosa…reconstructs	in	detail	the	situation	in	which	the	original	experience	takes	place	and	provides	a	phenomenologically	rich	description	of	the	sensory	and	motor	aspects	of	the	experience.	He	then	describes	a	way	in	which	memory	involves	a	simulation	of	a	previous	experience…The	earlier	modal	state	[eg,	visual	or	auditory]	is	as	if	again	seen	at	the	eye-door,	and	comes	into	focus…because	of	having	been	seen.”	(p.	9)		According	to	Buddhaghosa,	the	mind	is	structured	by	doors.	There	are	doors	for	each	of	the	senses	(the	eye-door,	the	ear-door,	and	so	on),	and	then	there	are	things	that	enter	the	doors	such	as	shrines	(called	“visible	data	as	objects”	on	Ganeri’s	translation).		There	is	also	a	door	for	the	mind	(the	mind-door),	and	things	can	enter	the	mind-door	without	any	new	sensory	stimulation.		According	to	Ganeri,	there	are	two	roles	for	a	past	perceptual	experience	in	the	structure	of	episodic	memory.	A	past	perceptual	experience	is	both	part	of	what’s	remembered	(“memory	involves	a	simulation	of	a	previous	experience”)	and	it	helps	explain	the	existence	of	the	memory	(“the	earlier	modal	state	is	as	if	again	seen…because	of	having	been	seen”).	Presumably	it’s	not	exactly	the	modal	state	that	is	“as	if	again	seen”	–	it	is	rather	a	scene	or	event	that	someone	earlier	saw,	by	having	the	experience.	But	even	with	this	adjustment,	the	previous	experience	(“modal	state”)	in	having	which	one	saw	the	temple	helps	explain	why	one	remembers	it,	and	in	that	sense,	the	past	experience	sustains	the	memory.		When	thinking	about	episodic	memory,	we	find	it	helpful	to	distinguish	between	two	dimensions	of	it,	corresponding	to	these	two	roles	for	experience.	The	memory	
relation	designates	how	a	subject	has	to	be	related	to	a	past	episode	in	order	to	remember	it,	whereas	the	memory	perspective	designates	how	a	past	or	putative	past	episode	is	characterized	by	the	rememberer.	This	distinction	(which	we	explain	in	detail	later)	provides	a	framework	for	discussing	what	a	Buddhist	theory	of	episodic	memory	might	say.		In	his	paper,	Ganeri	discusses	a	range	of	Buddhist	ideas	that	speak	to	both	aspects	of	episodic	memory.		He	also	examines	whether	episodic	memories	present	a	past	episode	to	the	rememberer	as	one	that	she	underwent,	and	if	so,	by	means	of	what	kind	of	first-personal	elements.		In	particular,	he	examines	how	to	theorize	memory	in	light	of	a	Buddhist	denial	of	the	existence	of	a	persisting	self.		Ganeri’s	tentative	conclusion	is	in	favor	of	the	approach	he	finds	in	Buddhaghosa.	We	will	argue	that	Buddhaghosa	has	much	less	of	a	theory	of	episodic	memory	and	its	first-person	elements	than	Ganeri	suggests.	We	don’t	know	the	extent	to	which	further	resources	for	articulating	it	are	present	in	Buddhaghosa’s	texts.			
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To	probe	what	a	Buddhist	theory	of	episodic	memory	might	look	like,	we	first	need	more	analysis	of	the	structure	of	episodic	memory	than	we	find	in	Ganeri’s	discussion.		We	start	in	sections	1	and	2	by	discussing	in	detail	the	distinction	between	the	memory	relation	and	the	memory	perspective,	and	their	respective	interactions	with	Buddhist	theories	about	the	self.	In	sections	2-6	we	turn	to	the	three	main	tools	Ganeri	uses	in	his	interpretation	of	Buddhaghosa:	the	metaphor	of	mental	time	travel,	the	idea	that	episodic	memory	is	‘reliving	past	experience’,	and	the	idea	that	the	‘reliving’	in	episodic	memory	is	a	kind	of	attention.	We	conclude	in	section	7	by	explaining	how	Ganeri	uses	these	tools	to	locate	the	first-personal	elements	of	episodic	memory	as	he	thinks	Buddhaghosa	construes	them,	and	argue	that	the	resulting	account	does	not	amount	to	a	theory	of	a	memory	perspective,	or	a	full	account	of	the	memory	relation.		
1.	The	memory	relation,	the	memory	perspective,	and	the	self	
		The	difference	between	the	memory	relation	and	the	memory	perspective	has	an	analog	in	perception.	When	we	study	perception,	we	can	ask	at	least	two	kinds	of	questions.			First,	we	can	ask	how	someone	has	to	be	related	to	an	object,	event,	property,	process,	plurality	or	anything	else,	in	order	to	perceive	that	thing.	For	instance,	many	20th	century	theorists	including	Grice	(1988)	and	Lewis	(1980)	develop	the	idea	that	perceived	things	cause	effects	in	the	perceiver,	whereas	Ptolemy	and	other	extramissionist	theorists	of	perception	posit	visual	rays	that	emanate	from	perceivers,	enabling	their	contact	with	a	part	of	the	world.4	Both	kinds	of	causal	theories	aim	to	explain	what	kinds	of	causal	dependence	constitute	perceiving.	Other	philosophers	such	as	Hyman	(1992)	have	denied	that	the	perceptual	relation	is	causal	at	all.		Second,	we	can	ask	which	mental	states	constitute	one’s	perspective	when	one	stands	in	the	perceptual	relation.	The	differences	between	how	things	appear	in	different	perceptions	are	differences	in	perceptual	perspective.	Abstracting	from	these	differences,	we	can	ask	what	kinds	of	states	constitute	one’s	perspective,	for	instance	by	asking	whether	one	could	be	in	the	same	kind	of	state,	no	matter	whether	one	is	hallucinating,	imagining,	dreaming,	or	failing	in	some	other	way	to	stand	in	any	perceptual	relation	to	the	things	one	hallucinates,	imagines,	or	dreams,	
																																																								4	On	extramission	theories,	see	Hatfield	(2002). 
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and	merely	seems	to	be	perceptually	related	to.5	When	one	does	stand	in	a	perceptual	relation,	typically,	one	also	enjoys	a	perceptual	perspective.6				An	analogous	distinction	between	these	two	directions	of	inquiry	applies	to	memory.	The	episodic	memory	relation	(which	we’ll	keep	calling	simply	‘the	memory	relation’,	since	for	us	the	other	kinds	of	memory	aren’t	at	issue)	is	a	relation	between	a	rememberer	and	an	episode	in	the	past.	When	we	ask	what	the	memory	relation	is,	we	are	asking	how	someone	has	to	be	related	to	something	in	the	past,	such	as	a	specific	episode,	or	a	type	of	episode,	in	order	to	remember	it.		For	instance,	analytic	philosophers	have	disagreed	about	whether	the	remembered	episode	has	to	cause	the	rememberer	to	have	the	memory	(as	per	Martin	and	Deutscher	1966,	or	not	as	per	Malcolm	1963),	and	about	whether	the	memory		relation	is	simply	a	relation	of	awareness	to	the	thing	remembered	(Russell	1912)	or	not	(Russell	1921).	On	behalf	of	Buddhaghosa,	Ganeri	develops	the	idea	that	the	memory	relation	is	a	form	of	attention	(as	is	the	memory	perspective	as	well).		So	far	we	have	mainly	spoken	as	if	you	lived	through	the	episodes	you	episodically	remember.		But	this	way	of	speaking	seems	at	odds	with	a	great	range	of	Buddhist	theories	and	commitments	concerning	the	human	subject.	If	subjects	such	as	Buddhists	construe	them	nonetheless	have	episodic	memories,	what	structure	might	those	episodic	memories	have?		Our	distinction	between	the	memory	relation	and	the	memory	perspective	provides	a	framework	for	discussing	what	a	Buddhist	theory	of	episodic	memory	might	say,	as	the	Buddhist	denial	of	persisting	selves	puts	different	constraints	on	each	dimension.			The	Buddhist	constraint	on	the	memory	relation	is	initially	straightforward.	The	relation	cannot	ever	hold	between	the	rememberer	on	Tuesday	and	an	episode	that	
she	lived	through	on	Monday,	because	on	Monday	the	rememberer	didn’t	exist.		By	contrast,	the	Buddhist	denial	of	persisting	selves	has	a	different	kind	of	impact	on	the	memory	perspective.	It	constrains	what	a	memory	perspective	can	accurately	present	as	having	obtained,	rather	than	directly	constraining	what	memory	perspectives	can	present.			
																																																								5	Some	approaches	to	perception	attempts	to	analyze	some	perceptual	perspectives	in	terms	of	perceptual	relations.	A	related	idea	is	that	there	are	perceptual	perspectives	one	has	when	dreaming	or	hallucinating	that	cannot	be	analyzed	in	terms	of	perceptual	relations.	For	an	overview,	see	Soteriou	(2016).	6	Are	perceptual	relations	essentially	perceptual	perspectives?	On	one	interpretation,	at	the	end	of	Perky’s	(1910)	experiment	in	which	the	subjects	start	out	looking	at	a	blank	screen	and	imagining	a	sunset	and	end	up	seeing	a	picture	of	a	sunset	that	is	gradually	projected	onto	the	screen,	these	subjects	combine	a	perceptual	relation	(to	a	picture)	with	a	non-perceptual	imaginative	perspective,	by	perceiving	(a	picture	of)	a	sunset	while	seeming	merely	to	imagine	one.	
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In	the	rest	of	this	section,	we’ll	explore	issues	with	a	more	intricate	way	to	reconcile	a	denial	of	a	persisting	self	with	the	possibility	of	the	episodic	memory	relation.		We’ll	discuss	the	memory	perspective	in	more	detail	in	the	next	section.				Again,	if	you	didn’t	exist	yesterday,	you	can’t	remember	what	you	did	yesterday.		However,	Buddhaghosa	still	could	allow	that	you	bear	the	episodic	memory	relation	to	the	past.		For	instance,	Buddhaghosa	could	replace	episodic	memory	by	persisting	selves	with	episodic	memory	by	and	of	continuants,	understood	roughly	as	locuses	of	potential	experience	that	are	continuous	with	each	other	in	an	appropriate	way,	such	as	psychological	continuity,	or	bodily	continuity,	or	mere	causal	continuity.7	Where	STuesday	is	the	continuant	of	a	locus	of	experience	who	existed	on	Monday	(we	can	call	that	locus	of	experience	SMonday),	on	Tuesday,		STuesday	can	episodically	remember	what	happened	on	Monday	to	SMonday).	You	could	then	bear	the	episodic	memory	relation	to	the	past	of	your	continuant	predecessors.			Applying	this	idea	to	Buddhaghosa’s	passage	contrasting	the	operations	of	the	mind-door	with	the	operations	of	the	eye-door,	the	ear-door,	and	so	on	might	yield	a	picture	like	this:	the	eye-door,	the	ear-door,	and	the	other	sensory	doors	are	faculties	that	deliver	experiences	to	a	string	of	continuants,	and	the	memory	relation	can	provide	a	basis	for	knowing	what	befell	the	continuants	whose	experiences	belong	to	a	continuous	life.	In	his	paper,	Ganeri	does	not	allude	at	all	to	continuants	of	any	kind.	Since	we	take	Ganeri	to	be	addressing	what	a	theory	that	denies	persisting	selves	could	say	about	memory,	we	are	going	to	discuss	Ganeri’s	Buddhaghosa	as	if	episodic	memory,	for	him,	relates	a	rememberer	to	a	predecessor	in	continuation.	Appeals	to	some	types	of	continuity,	however,	face	potential	complications.	The	complications	stem	from	the	metaphysical	theories	that	sometimes	embed	the	Buddhist	constraint.	Consider	the	idea	that	the	memory	relation	relates	a	subject	to	earlier	episodes	befalling	her	predecessor-in-continuation.	This	idea	appeals	to	a	kind	of	psychological	continuity.	If	something	like	this	idea	helped	make	sense	of	Buddhaghosa’s	outlook	as	Ganeri	interprets	it,	then	it	would	have	to	be	squared	with	another	idea	Ganeri	finds	in	Buddhaghosa:	that	there	are	no	human	agents,	and	therefore	no	bodily	or	mental	actions	that	would	structure	either	persistence	or	psychological	continuity.	Ganeri	(personal	communication)	points	to	The	Dispeller	of	
Delusion,	1767-1783,	which	contains	discussions	of	several	phenomena	(including	bending	and	stretching	one’s	body,	putting	on	a	robe,	drinking	from	a	bowl)	that	seem	to	reject	analyses	of	these	phenomena	in	terms	of	agency,	in	favor	of	analyses	that	avoid	it.	For	instance	in	the	part	about	eating	(1782),	Buddhaghosa	writes:		Inside	[the	body?]	there	is	no	self	which	devours….The	making	up	of	the	ball	of	food,	the	lifting	of	the	ball	and	the	opening	of	the	mouth	come	about																																																									7	For	discussion	(sometimes	critical)	of	how	to	analyze	psychological	continuity,	see	Shoemaker’s	1984	or	chapters	1	and	2	of	Olson	1997.		For	discussion	in	particular	of	causal	continuity,	see	section	2	of	Chadha	2014.	
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merely	by	means	of	the	diffusion	of	the	air	element	through	the	action	of	consciousness.	No	one	opens	the	jaw	bones	with	a	key	or	a	contrivance.8			If	one	follows	Ganeri	in	interpreting	Buddhaghosa’s	last	remark	(“no	one	opens	the	jaw-bones	with	a	key…”)	as	implying	that	the	jaw-bones	are	not	opened	by	anyone	at	all,	and	more	generally	as	construing	“actions	of	consciousness”	as	modifications	of	consciousness	that	do	not	involve	agency,	then	any	account	of	what	it	takes	for	two	locuses	of	consciousness	to	be	continuants	would	have	to	avoid	relying	on	the	idea	that	either	of	them	exercises	agency.	For	instance,	STuesday	could	not	fulfill	SMonday’s	intentions,	or	fittingly	feel	proud	or	embarrassed	by	what	SMonday	did.		These	forms	of	psychological	continuity	could	not	help	to	constitute	the	continuity	relation.	For	all	that,	Buddhaghosa	presumably	allows	that	there’s	a	difference	between	opening	one’s	mouth	for	a	reason	(such	as	because	one	wants	to	eat),	and	opening	one’s	mouth	involuntarily,	or	under	coercion.	If	so,	he	owes	a	reconstruction	of	this	difference	that’s	compatible	with	denials	of	agency.	If	psychological	accounts	of	continuity	were	unavailable	to	Buddhaghosa,	could	he	invoke	another	mode	of	continuity,	such	as	bodily	continuity	or	causal	continuity	involving	the	mental	faculties?	If	mental	faculties	like	mind-doors	or	eye-doors	don’t	persist,	then	presumably	their	operations	would	be	analyzed	in	terms	of	faculty-continuity,	re-raising	the	question	of	exactly	what	kind	of	continuity	that	could	be.9		Some	Buddhists’	metaphysical	pictures,	such	as	the	one	commonly	attributed	to	Dharmakirti,	potentially	pose	even	more	radical	challenges	to	analyzing	the	memory	relation.	Suppose	that	there	are	no	persisting	selves	because	the	world	is	maximally	fluxy:	nothing	persists.	Then	the	only	kind	of	continuity	that	could	underlie	the	memory	relation	would	be	links	between	momentary	occurrences.	It	is	open	to	debate	whether	such	links	could	be	used	to	single	out	a	recognizable	memory	relation.		We	have	focused	on	challenges	that	arise	for	analyzing	the	memory	relation	if	selves	or	other	entities	do	not	persist	over	time.		A	further	challenge	arises	if	no	selves	or	human	bodies	even	exist	at	a	time.		Setting	aside	how	to	chain	together	momentary	entities	through	some	form	of	continuity,	denying	the	existence	of	human	selves	or	human	bodies	raises	the	question	of	what	momentary	entities	are	even	available	to	be	chained	together	over	time.		If	there	ultimately	are	no	relata	chained	together	by	continuity,	then	presumably	there	can	be	no	memory	relation,	either.10	
																																																								8	We’re	grateful	to	Jonardon	Ganeri	for	pointing	us	to	these	passages.		9	In	principle	one	could	deny	persisting	selves	while	affirming	persisting	faculties,	but	this	combination	of	commitments	would	need	a	special	defense	to	show	why	the	factors	that	supposedly	rule	out	persisting	selves	allow	for	persisting	faculties,	such	as	the	mind-door.	10	For	further	discussion	of	how	memory	might	work	if	there	is	no	self	at	a	time,	see	Ganeri	on	Vasubhandhu,	also	Chadha	2014.	
	 7	
Before	looking	more	closely	at	Ganeri’s	rendition	of	Buddhaghosa’s	ideas	about	the	memory	relation,	we	look	more	closely	at	what	an	account	of	the	memory	perspective	would	illuminate.	
2.	The	memory	perspective	and	the	self		The	memory	perspective	is	the	perspective	of	the	rememberer	on	a	past	episode	or	putative	past	episode.	An	account	of	the	memory	perspective	is	an	account	of	the	way	a	putative	past	episode	is	presented	to	the	subject	in	her	memory.	Here	and	throughout	we	will	focus	on	a	subject’s	conscious	episodic	memories,	setting	aside	the	potential	possibility	of	unconscious	episodic	memories.			
	The	memory	perspective	has	two	crucial	aspects.	First,	in	a	memory	perspective,	an	episode	is	in	some	way	presented	as	having	occurred	in	the	past.	By	analogy,	just	as	a	spectator	in	the	theater	takes	in	the	drama	as	bounded	by	the	fiction	presented	on	the	stage,	the	rememberer	in	a	memory	perspective	apprehends	the	past	episode	as	having	occurred	in	the	past.	Cast	in	terms	of	logic,	marking	off	as	past	could	be	expressed	by	a	temporal	operator	(such	as	past,	future,	or	now)	that	attaches	to	a	timeless	proposition,	and	allows	us	to	evaluate	whether	the	proposition	is	true	at	any	of	the	times	indicated	by	the	operator.	Alternatively,	it	could	be	expressed	inside	the	content	of	a	time-bound	proposition.11	Second,	once	an	episode	is	marked	off	as	past,	the	memory	perspective	might	carry	implications	about	whose	past	the	episode	occurred	in.	The	second	crucial	feature	of	the	memory	perspective	is	its	stance	on	the	relationship	between	the	rememberer	
																																																								11	Could	the	passing	thought	of	an	episode	count	as	an	episodic	memory,	if	the	episode	seemed	merely	possible	(perhaps	appealing	or	aversive)	but	didn’t	seem	to	the	subject	to	be	something	occurred	in	the	past	–	even	though	it	actually	did?	For	a	classic	example	in	which	a	painter	remembers	a	scene	without	believing	that	he	remembers	the	scene,	and	instead	believes	that	he	only	imagines	the	scene,	see	Martin	and	Deutscher	(1966:	167-8).		Martin	and	Deutscher	however	do	not	speak	directly	to	whether	the	scene	is	presented	as	past	by	the	painter’s	memory	itself.	But	suppose	SMonday	walked	on	the	beach,	STuesday	vividly	entertained	a	scenario	of	walking	on	the	beach,	complete	with	the	perspectival	aspects	of	SMonday’s	experience,	and	due	in	part	to	that	experience,	but	without	marking	the	scenario	as	something	that	occurred	in	the	past.	Here,	some	aspects	of	the	memory	relation	connect	Tuesday’s	mental	state	to	Monday’s	walk,	without	the	typical	memory	perspective.	We	won’t	count	this	scenario	as	an	episodic	memory,	because	we	want	to	ask	how	the	‘pastness’	of	an	experience	might	figure	in	the	structure	of	the	memory	perspective.	We	therefore	focus	exclusively	on	memory	perspectives	that	present	a	remembered	episode	as	having	occurred	in	the	past,	so	that	we	may	see	in	what	way	Buddhaghosa’s	theory,	according	to	Ganeri,	might	account	for	this	aspect	of	paradigmatic	episodic	memories.				
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and	the	subject	of	the	remembered	episode.	Here	the	Buddhist	denial	of	a	persisting	self	would	interact	in	different	ways	with	the	status	of	the	memory	perspective.			On	one	option,	your	present	memory	perspective	would	say	that	the	past	episode	happened	specifically	to	you.	Here	the	Buddhist	constraint	would	not	rule	out	the	existence	of	a	memory	perspective	implying	one’s	past	existence,	since	the	Buddhist	constraint	can	allow	that	episodic	memory	perspectives	are	systematically	mistaken.	By	comparison,	even	if	(as	Galileo	held)	nothing	in	the	world	is	colored,	there	might	still	be	color	experiences	that	falsely	present	things	as	colored.			The	Buddhist	constraint	would	not	even	have	to	require	that	your	memory	perspective	is	inaccurate.		Your	memory	perspective	might	just	say	that	the	past	episode	happened	to	someone	continuous	with	you,	without	saying	that	the	episode	happened	to	you.	Or	your	present	memory	might	say	that	one	of	the	two	previous	options	is	correct,	without	saying	which.	Or	your	present	memory	perspective	might	even	be	neutral	on	those	options.12	Even	if	Buddhist	theories	deny	the	existence	of	a	persisting	self,	there	is	still	room	on	these	options	for	your	episodic	memory	perspective	to	be	accurate.		(We	bracket	the	further	problem	of	how	to	analyze	the	memory	perspective	when	denying	the	existence	of	a	self	that	exists	at	any	time,	let	alone	over	time).		Husserl	describes	these	two	aspects	of	the	memory	perspective	(pastness,	and	the	stance	on	the	relation	of	past	to	the	rememberer’s	life)	in	his	discussion	of	imagistic	fantasy	and	memory:		If	we	remember	A,	we	have	a	phantasy	appearance	of	A;	that	is,	according	to	my	presentation,	an	“image”	appearance	which,	therefore,	in	spite	of	all	the	similarity	with	a	perceptual	appearance,	is	differentiated	from	the	latter	by	the	characteristic	of	‘imaging’.	Here,	however,	the	mode	of	apprehension	is	not	the	mere	apprehension	belonging	to	a	phantasy	presentation.	What	
																																																								12	On	one	interpretation,	Evans	(1982)	argues	that	this	last	option	is	incoherent.		Even	by	his	lights,	something	nearby	might	be	coherent.	By	contrast	with	paradigmatic	memories,	some	mythical	crystal	balls	work	this	way:	you	gaze	into	the	ball	and	see	that	someone	walked	on	the	beach	last	Monday,	without	any	presumption	that	it	was	you,	or	someone	in	any	way	continuous	with	you.		Perhaps	if	the	experience	of	looking	into	the	crystal	ball	were	combined	with	a	belief	that	the	person	who	walked	on	the	beach	was	continuous	with	the	crystal-ball	gazer,	where	the	belief	was	based	on	testimony,	then	the	resulting	combination	could	be	a	hybrid	of	episodic	and	semantic	memory.	This	kind	of	case	falls	into	a	large	grey	area	surrounding	the	category	of	episodic	memory.		In	contrast	to	both	paradigmatic	memories	and	the	crystal	ball	hybrid,	if	a	mental	state	presented	an	episode	(such	as	walking	into	a	shrine)	as	past,	and	was	committed	to	the	discontinuity	between	that	past	experience	and	the	rememberer,	then	arguably	that	mental	state	would	not	be	a	memory	perspective.				
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appears	in	the	image	is	apprehended	as	something	past;	specifically,	as	something	that	has	been	present	(to	me)(2005:22)…	One	might	deny	that	the	memory	perspective	contains	an	image.	But	even	if	the	memory	perspective	is	structured	entirely	by	a	non-imagistic	informational	states,	rather	than	by	any	images,	the	same	point	about	the	internal	structure	of	the	memory	perspective	would	still	hold.		When	describing	Buddhaghosa	on	the	memory	perspective,	Ganeri	writes,	“In	memory	it	is	as	if	(viya)	one	is	perceiving	again.	This	encapsulates	the	key	idea	of	mental	time	travel,	a	reliving	of	past	experience”	(8).	Ganeri	seems	to	identify	mental	time	travel	with	reliving	past	experience,	and	here	he	may	be	following	Wheeler	and	Tulving,	who	make	a	similar	conflation.13	There	are	important	differences	between	these	formulations,	however,	and	they	have	different	limitations	in	illuminating	the	structure	of	episodic	memory.	We	therefore	discuss	them	separately.	We	argue	that	neither	of	them	provides	the	resources	needed	to	illuminate	the	memory	perspective	or	the	memory	relation.		
3.	Reliving	past	experience	We	will	work	with	a	fairly	literal	understanding	of	the	idea	of	reliving,	taking	it	to	consist	in	the	exact	repetition	of	a	past	experience.		Taking	the	idea	of	reliving	past	experience	as	a	guide	to	both	the	memory	relation	and	the	memory	perspective,	the	memory	relation	would	be	the	reliving	relation	to	a	past	experience,	and	the	memory	perspective	would	be	characterized	in	part	by	the	experience	that’s	‘relived’.		However,	reliving	in	the	form	of	exact	repetition	is	not	necessary	for	either	the	memory	relation	or	the	memory	perspective.	Since	it	is	possible	to	remember	slowly	something	on	Tuesday	that	happened	quickly	on	Monday,	not	all	remembering	involves	exact	repetition.	Repetition	is	also	not	sufficient	for	the	memory	relation	or	the	memory	perspective.	Regarding	the	memory	perspective:	you	could	repeat	an	experience	without	experiencing	it	as	something	that	happened	already	in	the	past.	For	instance,	you	might	pass	a	pond	without	realizing	that	you	have	made	a	giant	circle	on	your	hike,	and	have	a	perceptual	experience	upon	passing	the	pond	for	the	second	time	just	like	the	one	you	had	the	first	time	you	passed	it.	Here	your	experience	(type)	would	be	repeated,	but	you	could	still	fail	to	have	the	memory	perspective	on	your	original	experience,	or	bear	the	memory	relation	to	your	previous	experience.	“Déjà	vecu”	(already	lived)	need	not	mean	the	same	as	“déjà	vu”.	
																																																								13	E.g.,	Wheeler,	Stuss,	and	Tulving	write:	“One	of	the	most	fascinating	achievements	of	the	human	mind	is	the	ability	to	mentally	travel	through	time.	It	is	somehow	possible	for	a	person	to	relive	experiences	by	thinking	back	to	previous	situations	and	happenings	in	the	past	(1997:	331)”.	
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Analyzing	episodic	memory	in	terms	of	reliving	of	a	past	experience	suggests	that	the	memory	is	exactly	the	same	as	the	past	experience.	Herein	lies	a	further	limitation	in	accounting	for	the	memory	perspective.	If	memory	were	exactly	the	same	as	perception,	it	would	crowd	out	present	perceptual	experiences.	A	theory	of	memory	that	predicts	such	crowding	out	seems	wrong.	On	Tuesday,	one	can	remember	Monday’s	visit	to	the	temple,	at	the	very	same	time	as	one	is	experiencing	something	entirely	different	(such	as	the	inside	of	an	airport).	Buddhaghosa’s	own	discussion	of	‘triggers’	of	memory	(or	imagination)	arguably	relies	on	this	observation.14	In	whatever	ways	a	memory	might	involve	a	‘reliving’	of	a	past	experience,	the	memory	perspective	cannot	be	wholly	constituted	by	the	experience	remembered.	These	limitations	can	be	overcome	only	by	a	more	developed	theory	of	the	memory	relation	(to	rule	out	mere	repetition),	and	an	account	of	how	the	memory	perspective	is	structured	in	way	that	marks	out	an	episode	as	past.	It	is	not	enough	to	account	for	this	aspect	of	the	memory	perspective	to	specify	a	route	by	which	a	past	episode	affects	the	current	state	of	the	mind,	such	as	the	fact	that	it	enters	the	mind-door,	or	the	fact	that	the	rememberer	attends	to	it.	What’s	needed	is	an	analysis	of	how	the	episode	is	marked	as	past.		Notice	that,	without	an	analysis	of	pastness	in	the	memory	perspective,	we	will	also	lack	an	account	of	how	the	memory	perspective	stands	on	the	relation	between	the	rememberer	and	the	subject	remembered.	A	final	limitation	of	“reliving”	concerns	the	distinction	between	‘field’	and	‘observer’	memories	(briefly	discussed	by	Ganeri	on	p.X).	Nigros	and	Neisser	introduce	the	distinction	like	this:	In	some	memories	one	seems	to	have	the	position	of	an	onlooker	or	observer,	looking	at	the	situation	from	an	external	vantage	point	and	seeing	oneself	‘from	the	outside.’	In	other	memories	the	scene	appears	from	one’s	own	position;	one	seems	to	have	roughly	the	field	of	view	that	was	available	in	the	original	situation	and	one	does	not	“see	oneself.”	(467-468)15			When	remembering	from	the	observer	perspective,	there	will	be	typically	be	no	question	of	reliving	one’s	experience	from	the	time,	since	one’s	experience	from	the	time	presumably	was	not	from	the	observer	perspective	(although	Nigros	and	Neisser	do	intriguingly	“attest	to	the	possibility	of	experiencing	events	from	a	‘detached’	perspective	as	they	occur	(1983:	468)”).																																																											
14	Buddhaghosa	does	not	explicitly	say	that	you	can	continue	to	feel	your	present	uncomfortable	bed	while	thinking	back	to	your	past	comfortable	bed,	but	we	take	it	to	be	overwhelmingly	plausible	that	you	can	remember	a	past	episode	while	still	experiencing	a	present	trigger	of	your	memory.		15	In	Burge’s	2013:	155-60	taxonomy	of	episodic	memory	and	self-representation,	he	also	cites	Freud	1899	on	the	field/observer	distinction.		For	some	skepticism	about	the	distinction,	see	Vendler	1984	or	Wollheim	1984,	with	a	response	in	Sutton	2010.	
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Given	the	problems	we	have	described,	neither	the	memory	relation	nor	the	memory	perspective	can	be	understood	as	forms	of	reliving	past	experience.		Interestingly,	observer	memory	may	be	better	captured	by	the	other	part	of	Ganeri’s	formulation	that	he	equates	with	reliving	past	experience:	mental	time	travel.	In	mental	travel	to	a	past	event,	one	could	take	up	the	perspective	of	an	observer	on	oneself,	rather	than	one’s	past	perspective.	Time	travel	scenes	are	often	depicted	this	way	in	literature	and	film.	But	we	argue	next	that	the	metaphor	of	mental	time	travel	also	lacks	resources	to	analyze	the	memory	perspective,	though	for	slightly	different	reasons.16				
4.	Mental	time	travel		Unlike	the	idea	of	reliving	a	past	experience,	the	metaphor	of	mental	time	travel	has	a	distinctive	limitation	concerning	memories	of	types	of	experiences,	where	one	can	remember	the	type	because	one	has	undergone	experiences	of	that	type	in	the	past	(or	because	one’s	predecessor	has).	To	borrow	an	example	from	novelist	Tom	McCarthy,	the	narrator	of	his	novel	Satin	Island,	U,	remembers	the	bodily,	kinesthetic,	and	emotional	experiences	of	pedaling	backwards	on	a	bicycle	that	is	moving	forward.	U	remembers	the	lasting	thrill	of	this	directional	disconnect,	in	contrast	to	the	feeling	of	riding	a	more	primitive	(foot-braked)	bicycle	that	can	only	be	made	to	move	by	pedaling	in	the	direction	one	wants	to	go.	From	U’s	point	of	view,	he	is	remembering	(and	perhaps	simulating)	a	feeling	he	used	to	have	while	riding	a	bicycle.17	Memories	of	this	sort	do	not	purport	to	identify	a	unique	past	episode,	and	in	this	respect	they	are	not	episodic	memories	as	we	initially	defined	them.	But	they	are	closely	related,	and	can	be	seen	as	relivings	of	at	least	some	aspects	of	past	experience	by	abstracting	from	them.	For	all	Buddhaghosa’s	passage	says,	they	may	fall	within	the	class	of	phenomena	that	he	intends	to	be	illuminating.				Interestingly,	as	Ganeri	brings	out	in	other	work,	Buddhaghosa	explores	something	like	this	process	of	abstraction	for	the	case	of	perception.18	In	discussing	the	richness	of	perceptual	experience,	Ganeri’s	Buddhaghosa	writes:		“When	an	opportunity	for	experiencing	the	stimulus	of	an	object	has	been	encountered,	each	of	the	remaining	dhammas	associated	[with	feel]	only	experiences	a	[particular]	portion…	Just	as	a	cook	prepares	a	many-savoured																																																									16	For	recent	book	length	treatment	of	memory	as	mental	time	travel,	see	Michaelian	2016.	17	Imaginative	simulation	can	also	occur	without	memory	of	any	kind,	and	perhaps	imaginative	simulation	without	memory	is	the	paradigm	of	such	simulation.	Our	point	is	that	memory	of	experience	types	can	occur	simultaneously	with	imaginative	simulation.	18	Ganeri	discusses	this	passage	in	chapter	4	of	Attention:	Not	Self.	Oxford	University	Press,	2017.	
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dish,	puts	it	in	a	box,	and	seals	it	up,	after	which	he	undoes	it	in	the	king’s	presence,	breaks	the	seal,	opens	the	box	and	taking	the	best	from	all	the	soups	and	sauces,	puts	them	into	a	dish,	and	after	tasting	them	in	order	to	find	out	whether	there	is	any	fault	or	not,	he	then	brings	the	dish	varied	with	the	flavours	to	the	king,	and	the	king	makes	use	of	whatever	he	wishes…	For	just	as	the	cook	only	investigates	a	mere	portion	of	the	food,	so	the	remaining	dhammas	only	experience	a	mere	portion	of	the	object’s	stimulus	(flavour).”	B.	Fount	109	N.			If	‘the	object’s	stimulus	(flavour)’	is	a	low-level	gustatory	sensation	from	which	experience	is	drawn,	then	Buddhaghosa	is	describing	a	sparse	sampling	of	a	rich	feast,	where	the	sparse	sampling	yields	an	experience	that	abstracts	from	the	richness	of	a	prior	gustatory	state.	(Alternatively,	if	Buddhaghosa	is	describing	a	sparse	sampling	of	flavors	or	other	properties	of	objects	in	the	external	world,	then	the	process	is	less	closely	analogous	to	abstracting	from	a	mental	states	or	set	of	mental	states	(experiences)	to	form	another	mental	state	(a	memory)).	Memories	of	types	of	experiences	are	difficult	to	accommodate	with	the	metaphor	of	time	travel.		Since	time	travel	is	travel	to	a	specific	past	or	future	time,	mental	time	travel	to	the	past	involves	a	psychological	connection	to	a	specific	past	episode.			The	metaphor	of	mental	time	travel	has	a	more	serious	limitation	that	seems	to	be	inherited	by	Buddaghosa.		He	writes:		[A]fter	he	has	seen	the	Shrine	thus…at	another	time,	wherever	he	goes,	while	he	is	sitting	in	this	day	quarters	or	his	night	quarters,	as	soon	as	he	adverts	to	it,	it	is	as	if	the	Great	Shrine		decked	with	ornaments	came	into	focus	in	[lit.	came	into	the	avenue	of]	the	eye-door,	and	it	seems	like	the	time	when	he	circumambulated	the	Shrine…”	(p.	10).	Here	the	idea	of	mental	time	travel	is	arguably	not	specific	enough	to	distinguish	memory	from	other	modes	in	which	the	mind	constructs	or	apprehends	scenarios	besides	the	ones	it	is	perceiving.		Buddhaghosa’s	distinction	between	“entering	the	mind-door”	without	“stimulating	the	sense-faculty,”	and	“entering	the	eye-door”,	which	does	(constitutively?)	stimulate	a	“sense-faculty”	might	seem	to	introduce	a	structure	analogous	to	the	one	introduced	by	Husserl’s	mode	of	apprehension,	and	that	structure	is	a	step	toward	marking	an	experience	as	having	occurred	in	the	past.	But	“objects	entering	the	mind-door”	could	presumably	enter	the	“mind-door”	without	memory,	such	as	by	imagination	enabled	by	past	experiences.	Such	imaginations,	in	turn,	could	in	principle	be	supplemented	by	beliefs	that	the	experiences	belong	to	a	past	continuous	with	the	rememberer,	or	by	other	forms	of	commitment	to	this	effect.	If	they	are	so	supplemented,	they’re	at	best	a	hybrid	of	episodic	memory	and	imagination.	If	they’re	not	so	supplemented,	they	are	not	at	all	like	memory	perspectives.	Given	these	contingencies,	the	structure	introduced	by	the	doors	in	Buddhaghosa’s	passage	does	not	by	itself	analyze	the	memory	perspective.		
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In	part	of	the	long	passage	cited	by	Ganeri	(part	of	which	is	cited	in	the	opening	section	of	this	commentary),	Buddhaghosa	discusses	how	one	might	think	back	to	past	fine	food	when	confronted	with	a	present	pile	of	beans,	or	think	back	to	a	past	comfortable	bed	when	faced	with	a	present	uncomfortable	bed.19		These	parts	might	seem	to	single	out	memory.	But	the	overall	structure	introduced	by	the	mind-door	and	the	sense-doors	in	the	passage	Ganeri	cites	seem	to	concern	simply	cognition	of	scenes	that	can	be	sensed,	in	the	absence	of	sensory	stimulation	by	those	scenes	(or	by	scenes	like	them).	The	structure	does	not	pin	down	either	imagination	or	memory.	Perhaps	Buddhaghosa	in	these	passages	is	best	interpreted	as	aiming	to	analyze	a	general	form	of	cognition	of	non-present	scenarios,	of	which	memory	would	be	a	special	instance.20		Still,	we	can	ask	what	a	theory	of	episodic	memory	might	look	like	that	began	from	the	ingredients	Ganeri	highlights.	Here	we	will	move	beyond	the	idea	of	mental	time	travel,	and	focus	on	how	Ganeri	develops	the	idea	that	episodic	memory	is	a	form	of	attention.	We	argue	that	the	analysis	raises	important	questions	about	the	relata	of	the	memory	relation,	but	that	here,	too,	more	resources	are	needed	to	analyze	the	part	of	the	memory	perspective	that	takes	a	stand	on	the	nature	of	the	first-person	elements,	and	on	the	relationship	between	the	rememberer	and	the	locus	of	the	past	experience.	
5.	Reliving	through	attention	What	kind	of	attention	figures	in	episodic	memory,	according	to	Ganeri’s	Buddhaghosa?	What	are	its	objects?	Heard	in	one	way,	these	questions	concern	the	memory	relation.	If	there	was	a	hurricane	on	Monday,	and	Tuesday	you	episodically	remember	it	without	defects	either	in	Monday’s	experience	or	its	retention,	does	the	memory	relation	relate	you	to	Monday’s	hurricane,	or	to	your	experience	of	it	on	Monday,	or	both?21		Here	we	will	survey	the	role	of	attention	in	Buddhaghosa’s	
																																																								19	Here	we	have	in	mind	the	following	passage	of	Buddhaghosa	quoted	on	page	8	of	Ganeri	(emphasis	ours):	And	when	he	has	made	use	of	special	food	of	the	various	kinds,	sharing	it	out	with	his	companions	in	the	Life	Divine,	then	at	another	time,	wherever	he	gets	a	meal	of	beans,	as	soon	as	he	adverts	‘At	that	time	I	made	use	of	
special	food	of	the	various	kinds	sharing	out	with	my	companions	in	the	Life	Divine’	it	is	as	if	that	flavour	as	object	comes	into	focus	as	tasted.	This	is	how	a	flavour	as	object	comes	into	focus	as	tasted.	And	when	he	makes	use	of	a	bed	or	chair	or	a	coverlet	or	robe	that	has	a	pleasant	touch,	then	at	another	time	wherever	he	makes	his	bed	in	discomfort,	as	soon	as	he	adverts	‘At	that	time	I	used	a	soft	bed	and	chair’	it	is	as	if	that	tangible	datum	as	object	(phoṭṭhabhārārammaṇa)	comes	comes	into	focus	as	touched.	20	A	recent	view	that	construes	memory	as	a	special	case	of	this	kind	of	imagination	is	developed	by	De	Brigard	2014.	21	Once	one	tries	to	account	for	distorted	memories,	answers	become	more	complex.	The	complexities	we’re	setting	aside	include	the	possibilities	that	an	episodic	
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account,	try	to	resolve	an	apparent	conflict	within	the	account,	and	try	to	clarify	how	to	define	the	specific	form	of	attention	involved	in	the	account.	What	does	the	attempt	to	analyze	reliving	in	terms	of	attention	imply	about	the	memory	perspective?		According	to	Ganeri,	the	work	of	the	contemporary	experimental	researcher	Marvin	Chun	is	helpful	in	clarifying	the	role	of	attention	in	memory.	According	to	Chun	and	his	collaborators,	there	is	a	distinction	between	
external,	perceptual	attention	to	ordinary	non-mental	entities,	and	internal,	reflective	attention	to	mental	episodes	or	representations,	“such	as	thoughts,	memories,	imagery,	[or]	decision	options”	(ibid.).		Notice	how	Chun	seems	to	introduce	the	distinction	between	these	two	kinds	of	attention	in	terms	of	the	respective	objects	of	attention.			At	first	blush,	we	might	expect	that	according	to	Ganeri,	Buddhaghosa’s	episodic	memory	involves	reflective	attention	to	one’s	past	perceptual	experiences.	But	second	blush	is	not	so	clear.	Immediately	after	describing	the	work	of	Chun,	apparently	with	approval,	Ganeri	goes	on	to	write:	“Buddhaghosa’s	careful	reconstruction	of	a	case-study…seems	to	me	to	fit	the	paradigm	of	simulation	in	grounded	cognition	(Barsalou	2008)	rather	than	selection	of	a	stored	representation”.	Ganeri	goes	on	to	describe	episodic	memory	in	terms	of	simulation	rather	than	attention,	and	also	as	“non-representationalist”,	again	apparently	in	opposition	to	Chun	and	his	collaborators.							What	are	the	respective	roles	of	Chun	and	Barsalou	in	illuminating	what	Ganeri	takes	to	be	Buddhaghosa’s	view?		It	might	seem	initially	(as	it	did	to	us)	that	Chun	et	al	are	simply	a	foil	to	the	superior	view	of	Barsalou	that	is	ultimately	a	closer	match	to	Buddhaghosa	-	and	is	possibly	endorsed	by	Ganeri	as	correct,	or	at	least	as	promising,	in	its	own	right.	But	the	reading	on	which	Chun	is	cast	away	is	hard	to	square	with	Ganeri’s	remark	near	the	conclusion	of	the	relevant	section	that	“Buddhaghosa	treats	memory	as	a	kind	of	attention,	the	kind	which,	following	Chun,	we	can	call	reflective	attention”	(p.	10).		While	Ganeri	himself	does	seem	to	oppose	simulation	and	selection	(where	selection	presumably	goes	along	with	attention),	perhaps	these	two	operations	are	compatible.		For	instance,	when	Barsalou	speaks	of	simulation,	perhaps	simulating	a	past	perceptual	experience	is	a	way	of	attending	to	it.			According	to	a	potential	challenge	to	the	idea	that	simulating	is	a	way	of	attending	in	memory,	experiences	are	simulated,	but	things	experienced,	such	as	colors,	can	be	selected	or	attended,	but	not	simulated.			This	challenge	would	be	neutralized,	however,	if	the	following	observation	is	correct:	one	can	attend	to	a	past	smell	or	color	by	attending	to	a	past	perceptual																																																																																																																																																																						memory	can	inherit	the	misperceptions	in	the	remembered	experiences,	producing	a	correct	memory	of	an	incorrect	experience.		
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experience	of	the	smell	or	color.22	Together	with	the	hypothesis	that	memory	is	attention	to	a	past	experience,	this	observation	seems	to	imply	that	remembering	a	color	experience	includes	remembering	the	color.	And	this	consequence	seems	plausible.		What	would	it	be	to	remember	living	through	the	hurricane	(the	hurricane	experience),	without	remembering	(even	if	partly	misremembering)	the	hurricane?					By	drawing	on	this	observation,	we	can	respect	the	point	that	for	Ganeri’s	Buddhaghosa,	“Episodic	memory	is	attention	to	objects	from	past	perceptual	encounters.”	(Ganeri	p.	X)	On	this	reading,	Chun’s	account	provides	supplementary	detail	about	how	one	manages	to	attend	to	the	past	color	sounds	or	smell	experienced,	by	attending	to	one’s	past	perceptual	experiences	of	them.		In	particular,	Chun	provides	a	bridge	between	present	perceptual	cuing	and	the	past	objects	or	properties	experienced.	Perhaps	this	combination	of	ideas	is	behind	Ganeri’s	remark	that	“For	Buddhaghosa,	the	role	of	selection	in	retrieval	is	performed	by	perceptual	cueing,	something	in	one’s	present	perceptual	environment	prompting	one	to	select	among	many	potential	past	experiences.”				These	observations	have	an	important	upshot	for	understanding	the	distinction	between	external	and	reflective	attention	used	by	Ganeri.		If	some	“internal”	reflective	attention	to	perceptual	experiences	turns	out	to	also	involve	attending	to	the	external	objects	and	properties	previously	experienced,	we	won’t	be	able	to	characterize	“external”	attention	simply	as	that	kind	directed	to	external	objects	and	properties.		Some	reflective	attention	will	be	to	past	perceptual	episodes	as	well	as	to	what	those	past	perceptual	attitudes	were	of.				Ganeri	seems	to	need	to	draw	the	distinction	between	external	and	reflective	attention	in	a	different	way.		Perhaps	we	should	say	that	external	attention	is	directly	only	at	external	objects	and	properties,	where	as	reflective	attention	is	always	directed	at	internal	mental	states,	and	only	to	external	objects	and	properties	via	internal	mental	states.23	
	
6.	Attention:	sparse	or	rich?	We	now	raise	exegetical	questions	about	the	relationship	between	attention	and	the	memory	perspective,	beginning	with	the	relation	between	perception	and	attention.																																																									22	For	discussions	of	whether	it	really	is	possible	to	attend	to	a	perceptual	experience,	and	if	so	how,	see	Kind	(2003)	and	Stoljar	(2004).		As	their	discussion	brings	out,	in	principle	one	might	attend	to	one’s	past	perceptual	experiences	by	attending	to	past	entities	experienced,	in	a	reversal	of	the	direction	we	discuss	in	the	main	text.		We	won’t	pursue	the	option	further	though.	23	For	clear	evidence	that	Chun	actually	does	allow	for	reflective	attention	and	perceptual	attention	to	have	the	same	objects,	see	pp.	522-523	of	Chun	and	Johnson	2011.	
	 16	
First	recall	that	Buddhaghosa	describes	his	initial	visit	to	the	Great	Shrine	in	great	detail.	The	temple,	presumably	from	the	perspective	of	the	observer,	is	said	to	be			 whitewashed,	painted	with	yellow	and	red	ochre,	etc.,	hung	with	many	kinds	of	flags	and	banners,	festooned	with	garlands	of	flowers,	surrounded	with	clusters	of	lamps,	gleaming	with	the	loveliest	radiance	and	decked	with	ornaments.		Does	Buddhaghosa’s	detailed	description	require	that	the	perceiver	attends	to	all	of	those	details?	If	so,	perceptual	experience	is	“sparse”,	and	you	experience	only	those	objects,	spaces,	or	properties	to	which	you	attend,	and	attention	therefore	functions	as	a	“gatekeeper”	for	perception.	Or	does	Buddhaghosa	allow	that	some	aspects	of	the	scene	are	experienced	without	necessarily	being	attended?		If	so,	perceptual	experience	is	“abundant,”	and	it	is	possible	to	experience	entities	without	attending	to	them,	and	attention	does	not	function	as	a	gatekeeper	for	perception.24	At	first	these	questions	about	perception	might	seem	orthogonal	to	Ganeri’s	own	focus	on	memory.	But	given	his	use	of	the	idea	of	reliving	previous	perceptual	experiences,	we	think	we	need	to	hear	more	about	the	nature	and	structure	of	those	previous	experiences	to	understand	what	view	of	memory	Ganeri	is	proposing	on	behalf	of	Buddhaghosa.	The	distinction	between	sparse	and	abundant	perception	also	allows	us	to	formulate	parallel	question	about	whether	memory	is	sparse	or	abundant,	for	Ganeri’s	Buddhaghosa.			First,	we	can	ask	whether	(external)	attention	is	a	gatekeeper	for	storage.		If	it	is,	then	storage	is	sparse,	and	you	remember	only	what	you	(or	your	predecessor)	attended	to	in	perception.25		If	attention	is	not	a	gatekeeper	for	storage,	then	storage	is	abundant,	and	you	can	remember	entities	that	were	experienced	outside	attention.		Given	Buddhaghosa’s	detailed	description	of	the	Great	Shrine,	he	might	sympathize	with	both	abundant	views	of	perception	and	storage	(perhaps	the	‘sparse	sampling	of	a	rich	feast’	passage	quoted	earlier	could	be	read	in	this	way).		Here	attention	would	neither	be	a	gatekeeper	for	perception	nor	for	the	retention	of	what	you	perceive	in	memory.	Second,	we	can	ask	whether	(reflective)	attention	is	a	gatekeeper	for	retrieval.		If	it	is,	then	retrieval	is	sparse,	and	you	episodically	remember	only	what	you	presently	(reflectively)	attend	to.26	Ganeri	seems	to	sign	up	Buddhaghosa	for	such	a	view	by	speaking	as	if	memory	is	identical	to	reflective	attention	(to	such	and	such	objects).		But	it	is	possible	to	have	an	essential	link	between	episodic	memory	and	attention																																																									24	For	an	overview	of	the	debate,	see	Wu	(2014)	Attention	(Routledge).	And	for	some	classic	papers	in	the	debate,	see	Noe	(2002).	25	For	a	classic	example	of	such	a	view,	see	Wolfe	(1999).	26	De	Brigard	(2012)	argues	that	you	presently	remember	x	only	if	you	internally	attend	to	x.	
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without	going	so	far	as	to	identify	memory	and	attention.	On	an	abundant	view	of	retrieval,	you	can	episodically	remember	something	without	attending	to	it.		But	while	you	need	not	attend	to	all	of	what	you	episodically	remember,	perhaps	you	always	must	attend	to	some	of	what	you	episodically	remember.	On	this	picture,	episodic	memories	would	be	structured	into	an	attended	foreground	and	an	unattended	background.27		If	Buddhaghosa	indeed	allows	abundant	perception,	this	might	be	a	natural	picture	of	what	it	is	like	in	episodic	memory	to	relive	an	abundant	experience	of	a	richly	detailed	scene.		Summing	up,	we	can	illustrate	the	exegetical	options	as	follows:	
	 Perception	 Storage	 Retrieval	
1	 Sparse	 Sparse	 Sparse	
2	 Sparse	 	 Sparse	 Abundant	
3	 Sparse	 Abundant	 Abundant	
4	 Abundant	 Abundant	 Abundant	
5	 Abundant	 Abundant	 Sparse	
6	 Abundant	 Sparse	 Sparse	
7	 Abundant	 Sparse	 Abundant	
8	 Sparse	 Abundant	 Sparse	
	Which	combination	does	Buddhaghosa	hold,	and	why?		Again,	if	we	are	analyzing	memory	in	terms	of	the	reliving	of	past	experience,	it	would	be	good	to	hear	more	about	what	past	experiences	themselves	were	like	according	to	Buddhaghosa.			
7.	“Been	there,	done	that”:	Memory	and	the	first	person		Having	teased	apart	the	different	ways	in	which	Ganeri	discusses	the	structure	of	episodic	memory,	and	having	discussed	some	of	their	pros	and	cons,	we	now	tackle	the	question	of	whether	and	how	memory	engages	the	past	self.	A	first	attempt	by	Ganeri	to	identify	the	first-person	element	in	the	memory	perspective	centers	on	the	pathological	case	of	R.B.,	who	Ganeri	seems	to	claim	is	missing	a	‘feeling	of	ownership’	with	respect	to	a	past	experience	that	he	remembers	(the	case	is	from	Klein	and	Nichols	2012).		As	Roache	2016	puts	it,	this	is	the	Minus	Mineness	view	of	R.B.		Here	the	methodology	seems	to	be	to	look	at	a	pathological	case	where	something	normal	is	missing,	both	to	show	that	episodic	memory	doesn’t	necessarily	include	a	first-personal	element,	and	to	indirectly	tease	out	what	the	first-personal	element	involves.		A	first	proposal,	then,	is	that	for	Buddhaghosa,	the	memory	perspective	somehow	attaches	the	“feeling	of																																																									27	See	Gurwitsch	(1964),	Jennings	(2015),	and	Watzl	(2017)	for	extended	analyses	of	the	idea	that	attention	structures	perceptual	experience.		We	discuss	attention	and	the	epistemology	of	perception	in	Siegel	and	Silins	(2014)	and	Siegel	and	Silins	(forthcoming).	
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ownership”	(which	R.B.	is	missing)	to	the	past	experience.		We’ll	start	by	fleshing	out	an	initial	proposal	apparently	by	Ganeri	on	R.B.,	and	then	will	turn	to	a	quite	different	way	to	read	Ganeri	on	R.B.	Here	is	how	Ganeri	tries	to	articulate	what	is	missing	from	R.B.’s	episodic	memories.	On	the	basis	of	his	interpretation	of	R.B.’s	own	reports,	Ganeri	suggests	that	R.B.	remembers	doing	something	without	remembering	himself	doing	it.		For	example,	R.B.	remembers	studying	in	the	lounge,	but	not	himself	studying	in	the	lounge.	As	we	suggest	in	our	section	title,	Ganeri’s	emphasis	here	is	on	“been	there,	done	that”,	rather	than	“I’ve	been	there,	I’ve	done	that”.		Notice	that	episodic	memories	hereby	could	avoid	committing	even	to	the	existence	of	a	subject	that	existed	at	all	at	the	past	time,	never	mind	over	time.		So	the	memories	in	question	potentially	could	be	accurate	even	according	to	Buddhist	views	on	which	subjects	don’t	persist	over	time,	and	don’t	even	exist	at	all.			Let’s	now	examine	R.B.’s	reports	directly:		I	can	see	the	scene	in	my	head.	I’m	studying	with	friends	in	the	lounge	at	my	residence	hall.	I	am	able	to	re-live	it.	I	have	a	feeling	…	a	sense	of	being	there,	at	MIT,	in	the	lounge.	But	it	doesn’t	feel	like	I	own	it.	It’s	like	I’m	imagining,	re-living	the	experience	but	it	was	described	by	someone	else	(Klein	and	Nichols	2012:	687).			I	knew	that	I	once	could	walk,	but	it	wasn’t	‘me’	who	once	could	walk	Klein	and	Nichols	2012:	688).		Taking	R.B.’s	own	words	at	face	value	for	the	moment,	he	remembers	himself	studying	with	friends	in	the	lounge,	and	does	not	merely	remember	studying	in	the	lounge.		If	he	lacks	some	further	aspect	of	self-implication	in	his	memory	under	the	heading	of	“ownership”,	we	need	to	capture	it	in	some	other	way.		The	phrases	“remembering	doing”	vs.	“remembering	oneself	doing”	are	not	enough	to	identify	what	would	be	involved	in	“ownership”.	Given	that	R.B.	also	speaks	of	“reliving”	his	past	experiences,	it	also	seems	that	the	language	of	“reliving”	is	also	insufficient	to	pin	down	ownership.			The	difference	between	R.B.	and	rememberers	who	have	the	sense	of	ownership	that	he	says	he	lacks	is	not	the	difference	between	identifying	the	remembered	experience	as	something	one	lived	through	and	not	so	identifying	it.		It	is	a	difference	between	two	ways	of	identifying	a	past	experience	as	one’s	own.		But	can	we	even	take	R.B.’s	words	at	face	value?		How	can	you	know	that	you	once	could	walk,	without	knowing	that	“you”	once	could	walk?	Perhaps	R.B.	has	perfectly	ordinary	episodic	memories	of	his	own	past,	but	an	inability	to	describe	them	properly.		Here	any	sort	of	failure	of	“ownership”	of	his	past	would	be	at	the	level	of	his	description	of	his	memories	rather	than	of	his	memories	themselves.		As	Roache	2016	puts	it,	this	would	be	R.B.	minus	minus	mineness!		Alternatively,	as	Roache	2016:	486	points	out,	it	could	be	that	the	best	account	of	R.B.	involves	the	positive	
	 19	
presence	of	abnormal	phenomenology,	rather	than	just	the	absence	of	normal	phenomenology.		Indeed,	some	of	R.B.’s	reports	seem	to	suggest	such	a	view:		 “But	the	feeling	was	that	the	scene	was	not	my	memory.	As	if	I	was	looking	at	a	photo	of	someone	else’s	vacation.	(Klein	and	Nichols	2012,	p.	686).”	Here	R.B.’s	memory	seems	to	rule	out	that	he	is	the	person	in	the	scene,	rather	than	simply	be	silent	about	whether	he	is	the	person	in	the	scene.		So	rather	than	merely	lacking	a	sense	of	ownership,	here	he	seems	to	have	a	positive	sense	of	exclusion.		(For	a	response,	see	Klein	2016).			We’ll	now	bracket	these	questions	and	will	work	with	the	assumption	that	R.B.	does	have	episodic	memories	without	ownership,	and	examine	how	Ganeri	might	try	to	capture	the	phenomenon	with	his	account.				We	begin	by	quoting	his	formulation	of	Buddhaghosa’s	two-factor	view:		 “In	the	terminology	of	Dokic	(2014)	this	as	a	“two-tiered”	account	of	episodic	memory:	episodic	memory	is	factored	into	a	component	consisting	in	a	first-order	memory	of	a	past	happening	together	with	a	second	component.		The	second	component	consists	in	a	proprietary	kind	of	phenomenology	specific	to	episodic	memory	(Dokic	describes	it	as	a	“metacognitive	feeling”)	rather	than	in	a	representation	of	oneself	as	having	had	the	experience	in	the	past,	and	autonoesis	is	a	distinct	kind	of	attention,	attention	to	the	past	by	simulating	it	in	working	memory.”	(Ganeri	p.	XX).		An	initial	question	is	about	how	to	specify	the	first	component	of	the	account.	On	the	face	of	things,	it	is	awkward	to	say	that	episodic	memory	consists	of	a	memory,	together	with	a	second	component.		What	is	this	first	memory?		If	it’s	an	episodic	memory	the	account	seems	to	be	viciously	circular.		It	would	tell	us	what	episodic	memory	is	by	telling	us	that	episodic	memory	is	episodic	memory	plus	X.		Compare	someone	who	tells	us	that	knowledge	is	knowledge	plus	X.		Alternatively,	if	the	first	memory	is	not	an	episodic	memory,	it	would	be	nice	to	hear	more	about	what	kind	of	memory	it	is,	as	well	as	more	about	how	the	phenomemology	involved	in	the	second	component	can	interact	with	it.		On	a	natural	interpretation	of	Ganeri,	the	two	component	view	aims	to	capture	cases	like	that	of	R.B.	by	sharply	distinguishing	between	reliving	in	memory	and	having	ownership	of	one’s	past	in	memory.	The	components	turn	out	to	be	separable,	and	this	enables	us	to	explain	what	is	going	wrong	with	cases	such	as	that	of	R.B.,	while	being	able	to	explain	what	is	going	right	with	cases	such	as	non-pathological	subjects.	R.B.	has	the	first	component	without	the	second,	and	lacks	ownership	of	his	past	because	he	lacks	the	second	component.	Non-pathological	subjects	have	both	the	first	component	and	the	second	component,	and	thereby	have	both	relivings	of	their	past	and	ownership	of	their	past.	
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	What	evidence	is	there	in	favor	of	this	first	reading?		First,	consider	that	Ganeri	uses	the	pathological	case	of	R.B.	rather	than	an	ordinary	example	to	distinguish	between	remembering	doing	and	remembering	oneself	doing.		If	remembering	doing	is	all	that	ever	happens	when	we	episodically	remember,	there’s	no	particular	need	to	appeal	to	R.B.	to	illustrate	the	possibility	of	reliving	without	ownership---we	are	all	R.B.!		Second,	consider	Ganeri’s	(page	X)	further	description	of	the	second	component	of	episodic	memory	with	ownership:			 Unlike	the	feeling	of	pastness,	the	episodic	feeling	has	a	metacognitive	dimension;	it	somehow	concerns	the	relationship	between	our	present	memory	and	our	past	experience.	…We	may	refer	to	the	celebrated	passage	in	William	James:	“A	farther	condition	is	required	before	the	present	image	can	be	held	to	stand	for	a	past	original.	That	condition	is	the	fact	that	the	imagined	be	expressly	referred	to	the	past,	thought	as	in	the	past...But	even	that	would	not	be	memory.	Memory	requires	more	than	mere	dating	of	a	fact	in	the	past.	It	must	be	dated	in	my	past.	In	other	words,	I	must	think	that	I	directly	experienced	its	occurrence.	It	must	have...	‘warmth	and	intimacy’...”	(James	1890:	650).	To	meet	these	conditions,	it	is	not	enough	in	some	sense	to	replay	an	event	or	action	from	one’s	past.	One	instead	must	relate	our	present	memory	to	our	past	experience,	and	even	think	that	one	had	the	experience	in	question	in	the	past,	in	some	phenomenologically	rich	way.		Given	that	these	conditions	go	far	beyond	the	simulation	of	a	past	experience,	they	seem	to	go	beyond	what	R.B.	does,	and	instead	be	designed	to	capture	something	like	“ownership”.		When	non-pathological	subjects	episodically	remember	their	past,	they	would	be	doing	something	along	those	lines.		A	problem	here	is	that	there	is	a	quite	different	way	to	interpret	Ganeri.		Here	we	can	rely	on	Ganeri’s	own	words	from	page	17:		Buddhaghosa	clearly	wants	to	explain	the	phenomenon	of	mental	time	travel	into	one’s	subjective	past	without	appeal	to	a	retrieval	mechanism	involving	ownership	(when	he	considers	someone	reflecting	on	the	question	“Did	I	exist	in	the	past?”,	he	does	not	even	entertain	the	possibility	that	the	question	can	be	answered	in	the	affirmative	based	on	episodic	memory	(Ma.	68;	Jawawickrama	2009,	para.	25)).		This	discussion	of	episodic	memory	seems	to	conflict	with	the	earlier	description	from	page	12	of	Ganeri.		There	Ganeri	went	along	with	the	Jamesian	claim	that	memory	involves	the	dating	of	something	in	your	past,	and	not	just	the	past.		On	the	Jamesian	approach,	if	you	were	to	ask	yourself,	“did	I	exist	in	the	past?”	you	would	
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be	able	to	ask	the	question	with	a	“yes”	if	you	relied	just	on	your	episodic	memory.		But	on	page	17	of	Ganeri,	it	now	sounds	like	episodic	memory	leaves	the	question	open,	and	does	not	involve	a	sense	of	ownership	even	in	ordinary	cases.		On	the	new	reading	of	Ganeri,	R.B.	satisfies	both	components	of	Buddhaghosa’s	account	without	having	something	like	ownership	of	his	past,	and	no	factor	of	the	account	is	designed	to	capture	ownership.		On	this	interpretation,	it	seems	that	we	we	actually	are	all	R.B.				We	are	not	clear	on	which	reading	to	favor,	or	on	whether	there	is	a	further	reading	we	have	so	far	missed,	and	would	like	to	hear	more	on	the	matter	from	Ganeri.		Rather	than	rely	on	R.B.	to	highlight	a	missing	factor	that	can	make	a	reliving	of	experience	into	a	case	of	memory,	it	seems	better	to	highlight	the	possible	ways	in	which	the	memory	perspective	might	in	principle	attribute	a	past	experience	to	locus	of	experience.	Assuming	that	the	perspectives	here	mark	off	a	perceptual	experience	as	having	occurred	in	the	past,	there	seem	in	principle	to	be	at	least	four	possible	commitments	that	a	memory	perspective	could	make	concerning	the	first-person	perspective	embedded	in	the	perceptual	experience.		(i) Uncommitted	to	continuity:	the	first-person	element	that	picks	out	the	subject	of	the	past	experience	is	neutral	on	whether	or	not	that	locus	of	past	experience	is	continuous	with	the	rememberer.		(ii) Committed	to	continuity,	neutral	on	identity:	the	first-person	element	that	picks	out	the	subject	of	the	past	experience	is	committed	to	continuity	with	the	rememberer,	but	neutral	on	whether	the	locus	is	also	identical	or	is	merely	continuous	with	the	rememberer.	(iii) Committed	to	continuity,	denies	identity:	the	first-person	element	that	picks	out	the	subject	of	the	past	experience	is	committed	to	mere	continuity	with	the	rememberer,	and	denies	identity.	(iv) Committed	to	identity:	the	first-person	element	that	picks	out	the	subject	of	the	past	experience	is	committed	to	the	identity	of	the	rememberer	and	the	locus	of	the	past	experience.		Option	(i)	seems	like	a	poor	candidate	for	characterizing	memory	perspectives,	because	it	makes	no	claim	to	present	episodes	that	the	rememberer	or	someone	continuous	with	her	lived	through.	For	all	a	perspective	conforming	to	option	(i)	would	say,	memory	perspectives	are	like	past-directed	crystal	balls	that	purport	to	indicate	that	a	perceptual	experiences	was	had	in	the	past,	without	taking	any	stand	on	how	the	locus	of	the	past	experience	is	related	to	you.	The	perspective	could	be	accurate	if	someone	–	anyone	–	lived	through	the	experience.				At	the	other	extreme,	option	(iv)	predicts	systematic	error	in	episodic	memories,	given	the	Buddhist	view	that	there	are	no	persisting	selves.	In	contrast,	option	(ii)	characterizes	a	perspective	on	which	the	rememberer	is	continuous	with	the	subject	of	the	perceptual	experience	that’s	presented	as	past.	But	in	occupying	such	a	
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memory	perspective,	memory	perspectives	avoid	taking	on	a	stand	on	the	metaphysical	question	of	whether	they	are	identical	or	merely	continuous	with	the	subject	of	the	past	experience.		Option	(iii)	makes	the	memory	perspective	more	committal,	but	avoids	flouting	the	Buddhist	constraint	on	persisting	selves.	In	formulating	a	theory	of	memory	on	behalf	of	Buddhaghosa,	Ganeri’s	strategy	seems	to	be	to	see	how	far	a	memory	perspective	can	be	reconstructed	using	only	the	first-person	elements	in	the	perceptual	experience	that	is	‘re-lived’	or	attended.	He	writes:		What	Buddhaghosa	does,	then,	is	to	separate	out	two	ideas	that	can	easily	be	confused:	the	idea	that	episodic	memory	is	a	reliving	or	re-experiencing	of	one’s	personal	past	experience,	and	the	different	idea	that	episodic	memory	requires	a	sense	of	ownership.	The	hypothesis	that	episodic	memory	is	attention	to	one’s	past	provides	a	model	with	the	first	feature	but	without	the	second,	and	case	studies	of	severe	amnesia,	such	as	that	of	R.B.,	seem	to	confirm	that	the	two	features	are	indeed	separable.	If	Buddhaghosa	is	right,	what	sets	episodic	memory	apart	is	a	specifically	autonoetic	way	of	attending	to	events,	and	there	is	no	requirement	to	appeal	to	self-representation	or	ownership	at	all.		We’ve	argued	that	this	strategy	won’t	address	whether	the	experience	is	marked	as	past,	since	the	same	kind	of	first-person	elements	could	figure	in	an	imagined	experience.	If	you	were	just	imagining	being	Buddhaghosa	walking	through	a	shrine,	for	instance,	rather	than	remembering	walking	through	a	shrine,	you	could	attend	to	the	same	experience.	What’s	needed	is	some	indication	within	the	memory	perspective	of	how	the	subject	in	the	past	experience	relates	to	the	rememberer.	Conversely,	even	once	that	marking-off	is	added	on,	the	options	(i)-(iv)	are	all	still	left	open.	Option	(i)	seems	implausible,	and	Ganeri	perhaps	suggests	that	Buddhaghosa	avoids	option	(iv).	Perhaps	a	theory	inspired	by	Ganeri’s	Buddhaghosa	would	offer	grounds	for	selecting	option	(ii)	or	(iii).	
Conclusion	As	we	read	Ganeri,	the	theory	of	episodic	memory	he	reconstructs	on	Buddhaghosa’s	behalf	includes	stances	on	both	the	memory	relation	and	the	memory	perspective.	Putting	together	his	formulations	of	Buddhaghosa’s	view	in	terms	of	attention	and	reliving	past	experience,	the	theory	seems	to	go	like	this.	Episodic	memories	occur	when	a	past	experience	is	relived,	and	a	past	experience	is	relived/mental	revisited	when	it	is	attended	to,	using	reflective	attention.	We’ve	been	assuming	that	in	reflectively	attending	to	a	past	experience	(such	as	the	experience	of	the	hurricane),	one	is	also	attending	to	the	event	experienced	in	the	past	(the	hurricane).	We	set	aside	complications	that	arise	from	when	the	original	experience	was	not	veridical	(leaving	no	events	experienced	to	attend	to),	or	when	post-experiential	memory	distorts	the	experience	(modifying	the	sense	in	which	one	
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is	attending	to	the	past	experience).	When	these	complexities	are	set	aside,	the	memory	relation,	on	this	reconstruction,	is	a	relation	of	attention,	and	its	relata	include	both	events	(like	hurricanes)	and	past	experiences	of	them.		And	the	memory	perspective,	on	this	reconstruction,	consists	in	reflectively	attending	to	a	putative	experience.			In	response	to	Ganeri,	we	have	argue	that	reliving	and	mental	time	travel	come	apart,	and	that	neither	suffices	to	capture	episodic	memory,	since	you	can	repeat	an	experience	without	remembering	it,	or	mentally	time	travel	through	imagination	rather	than	memory.		We	also	argued	that	reliving	is	not	even	necessary	for	episodic	memory,	since	your	memory	can	differ	in	its	duration	from	the	experience	you	remember,	and	since	you	can	episodically	remember	from	the	observer	perspective	rather	than	the	participant	perspective.		So	far,	our	points	left	room	for	the	view	that	memory	can	be	explained	as	mental	time	travel	through	reflective	attention.		There	we	responded	that	too	much	remains	open	about	exactly	how	we	reflectively	attend,	as	well	as	about	what	we	reflectively	attend	to.		Also,	we	argued	that	the	mere	fact	of	attending	to	a	past	experience	does	not	imply	that	it	is	now	in	any	way	grasped	or	otherwise	marked	off	as	having	occurred	in	the	past.	If	a	past	experience	explains	a	present	one,	but	is	not	marked	in	the	present	perspective	as	past,	then	it	is	a	fortiori	not	marked	as	having	occurred	in	‘my’	past,	or	in	the	past	belonging	to	someone	of	whom	I’m	a	continuant.	In	this	way,	one	of	the	difficult	philosophical	questions	about	the	type	of	first-person	element	in	memory	perspective	is	not	addressed	by	the	theory	we	take	Ganeri	to	have	outlined	on	behalf	of	Buddhaghosa.	We	close	with	two	residual	questions	raised	by	the	view	of	episodic	memory	developed	by	Ganeri’s	Buddhaghosa.	First,	once	the	theory	Ganeri	outlines	on	Buddhaghosa’s	behalf	is	developed	further,	can	it	respect	the	ways	in	which	memories	involve	construction?	While	Ganeri	often	speaks	of	memory	in	terms	of	“retrieval”,	and	we	have	done	so	ourselves	above,	that	metaphor	may	be	inapt	for	how	memory	really	works.		For	a	classic	example,	rather	than	function	as	a	library,	your	memory	might	construct	a	library,	as	in	Brewer	and	Treyen	1981’s	case	of	“scene	completion”	where	subjects	recalled	the	university	office	they	had	just	been	in	as	containing	books---as	one	would	expect	a	university	office	to	do---when	in	fact	none	were	there.		Or	more	radically,	consider	Wade	et	al	2002’s	experiments,	where	they	arguably	succeeded	in	inducing	episodic	memories	through	interviews	in	which	experimenters	and	subjects	discussed	doctored	photos	of	the	subjects.		In	these	cases,	episodic	memory	cannot	be	functioning	to	retrieve	experiences	one	had,	and	yet	is	not	conceived	of	by	the	experimenters	as	somehow	malfunctioning,	but	instead	of	just	doing	what	(episodic)	memory	does---construct.		Given	Ganeri’s	interest	in	integrating	classical	Indian	philosophy	with	contemporary	cognitive	science,	we	are	curious	about	whether,	and	how,	Ganeri	would	take	current	constructive	perspectives	on	memory	on	board.28																																																											28	For	some	philosophical	overviews	on	constructive	views	of	memory,	see	Michaelian	2013,	Frise	(2017),	or	Salvaggio	(forthcoming).			
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Second,	if	memory	relates	the	rememberer	to	a	predecessor-in-continuation,	where	does	leave	the	idea	that	suffering	stems	from	attachment?	If	attachment	has	to	be	attachment	to	one’s	past	self,	presumably	it	is	manifested	in	large	part	by	the	memory	perspective.	For	instance,	if	one	hopes	to	vindicate	one’s	disappointing	past	in	how	one	tries	to	shape	one’s	future,	the	forms	of	temporal	consciousness	that	go	along	with	this	mode	of	putative	agency	will	involve	memory	perspectives.	But	if	the	memory	perspective	avoids	manifesting	the	illusion	of	persisting	selves,	then	it	will	give	rise	neither	to	attachment,	if	attachment	is	fundamentally	attachment	to	one’s	past	and	present	self,	nor	to	the	suffering	supposedly	caused	by	attachment.	This	picture	would	therefore	seem	to	avoid	attributing	suffering	due	to	any	forms	of	attachment	that	are	built	in	to	memory.	It	seems	to	predict	far	less	attachment	and	suffering	than	Buddhists	are	commonly	thought	to	acknowledge.		If	the	prediction	of	reduced	suffering	isn’t	acceptable	to	Buddhaghosa,	then	it	would	seem	that	the	cause	of	suffering	would	have	to	be	re-analyzed	in	terms	of	attachment	to	continuants,	rather	than	being	analyzed	in	terms	of	attachment	to	a	supposedly	persisting	self.	And	in	that	case,	the	supposed	metaphysical	error	of	positing	persisting	selves	would	seem	to	have	little	ethical	significance.29				BIBLIOGRAPHY		Barclay	(1994)	“Composing	Selves	through	Improvisation”	in	U.	Neisser,	The	
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